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BOOK REVIEW
A HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION, By Daniel A.
Farber and Suzanna Sherry, Minnesota, West Publishing
Company. 1990. Pp. 458. Softbound. $31.00.
Reviewed by Howard C. Anawalt*
This book is an excellent history of our Constitution. It com-
bines selections of original sources, such as draft provisions and de-
bates, with short summaries or commentaries written by the editors
to give necessary background and fill gaps. It is short and well or-
ganized. The editing and writing keep the reader's attention.
The book is organized into three parts. Part One examines the
period of the formation of the original Constitution and Bill of
Rights (1787-91). Part Two, "The Reconstruction Amendments,"
deals with the Civil War history and amendments. Part Three con-
tains two chapters discussing the Supreme Court's use of history and
the relevance of original intent to the meaning of the Constitution.
In addition, five helpful appendices round out the book. Appen-
dix A is the Constitution, Appendix B contains drafts of the original
Constitution, and Appendix C presents drafts of the Bill of Rights.
Appendix D is a bibliographical dictionary which introduces the del-
egates who attended the Constitutional Convention, the members of
the First Congress, and major figures from the Civil War and Con-
struction period. Appendix E gives a list of further reading keyed to
the book's three parts. There is an eight page index which seems
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adequate, although my use of it while writing this review suggests
that it might be improved in a subsequent edition.'
In sum, the book is a great aid to all who study or use the
Constitution. As a reference for those teaching constitutional sub-
jects, it is nearly indispensable. It is also a fine book for history stu-
dents and those who love a good history book.
The history of our Constitution contains themes and episodes
that are particularly valuable to think about in our current world of
very fast paced and fundamental change. I would like to review just
a few of those as they emerge from the book.
I. AUTHORITY AND SOVEREIGNTY
On May 25, 1787, when the convention began, the authority
and power of the convention to do anything like draft a new constitu-
tion was in complete doubt. The doubt remained after the ratifica-
tion process was completed and perhaps even after some years of
successful operation of the constitutional government.
At the time of the convention, the equivalent of a national gov-
ernment was the confederacy established under the Articles of Con-
federation. Article XIII provided that the union under the confeder-
acy should be perpetual and unalterable, unless alterations were
agreed to in Congress and confirmed by each state legislature.' The
governing authority of the confederacy was, however, weak. It lacked
power to tax, to regulate commerce, and to assure that its acts were
observed in the several states. These weaknesses led to the resolution
of Congress calling for the convention.
The congressional resolution was limited and conformed to the
restrictions of the Articles of Confederacy concerning alteration. The
resolution called the convention "for the sole and express purpose of
revising the Articles of Confederation."' The convention had no ex-
press authority to write a new fundamental law and certainly was
granted no authority to override the alteration requirements of Arti-
cle XIII. Nevertheless, the convention did both. Article VII of the
proposed constitution our now existing Constitution boldly stated
that "the Ratification of the Conventions of nine States shall be suf-
ficient for the Establishment of this Constitution between the States
1. The index includes some detail, for example, a reference to a concept of animal rights
argued in the original debates on slavery.
2. D. FARBER & S. SHERRY, A HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION 37 (1990)
(referencing article XIII of the Articles of Confederation).
3. Id. at 37 (emphasis added).
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so ratifying the Same." 4
The question, "Can we act to propose a new constitution?" was
no easy one for the delegates. The matter was brought immediately
to a head by Edmond Randolph's proposal of the "Virginia Plan"
which would have substituted a national union for the confederacy.
Mr. Lansing of New York objected to the plan on the basis of "want
of power in the Convention to discuss & propose it." 5 Mr. Patterson
of New Jersey added that, "I came here not to speak my own senti-
ments, but the sentiments of those who sent me." He then referred to
Article XIII and added that "what is unanimously done, must be
unanimously undone. '
Pennsylvania's James Wilson argued that the problem of au-
thority could be solved by sweeping it aside: "With regard to the
power of the Convention, he conceived himself authorized to con-
clude nothing, but to be at liberty to propose any thing."' Randolph
urged a more radical view:
Mr. Randolph, was not scrupulous on the point of power.
When the Salvation of the Republic was at stake, it would be
treason to our trust, not to propose what we found neces-
sary. . . . There are certainly seasons of a peculiar nature
where the ordinary cautions must be dispensed with; and this is
certainly one of them. He would not as far as depended on him
leave any thing that seemed necessary, undone. The present mo-
ment is favorable, and is probably the last that will offer.s
Randolph's view is understandable. He and others felt the urgency
of the times, and understood it to press upon them an obligation to
solve. Nevertheless, the view is deeply troublesome, for it is exactly
such judgments as to necessity that permit sweeping aside rights peo-
ple have struggled to establish, including those of our Constitution.
Randolph's argument concerning necessity, in effect, carried the
day. However, the issue of authority also led to the question-where
did power or sovereignty reside? Before the American Revolution
power rested with the British constitutional monarchy,9 but when
4. U.S. CONST. art. VII (emphasis added).
5. D. FARBER & S. SHERRY, supra note 2, at 32.
6. D. FARBER & S. SHERRY, supra note 2, at 32.
7. D. FARBER & S. SHERRY, supra note 2, at 33.
8. D. FARBER & S. SHERRY, supra note 2, at 41.
9.
In. the colonial period, the royal governors constituted an executive that was
in some says stronger than the king himself. Because various acts derived from
the Glorious Revolution of 1688 did not apply to the colonies, the governors
exercised some powers denied to the king in England. Governors were permitted
1990]
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the ties to Britain were severed, what took its place? The matter
would be critical, for the new constitution would have to gain power
from somewhere, if it were ever to be a government. The editors
point out that "sovereignty was an evolving concept to the men at the
Convention."'" The framers considered at least two sources for the
new American sovereignty: power came from the states as nations, or
power came directly from the people." The latter idea was novel,
indeed.
The debates appear to have been rich with arguments favoring
both state and popular sovereignty, but it was not necessary for the
convention to choose a theory, so long as they could assure them-
selves that their power could be effectively exercised. In effect the
debates served to test political will. The convention did not choose
between the theories, but it implicitly determined that it could ex-
press an organization of effective government that would be adopted.
The delegates gambled. History shows they won. 2
II. SECRECY
The debates were a delicate matter. The delegates knew that
their ultimate product would "go public" on the grandest scale possi-
ble. They also believed that absolute secrecy of their proceedings
would be essential to their work: without confidentiality, they would
not be able to avoid premature politics, posturing, and interference.
As a first order of business the convention resolved "That nothing
spoken in the House be printed, or otherwise published or communi-
cated without leave."'" Despite numerous note-takers, "the proceed-
ings in Independence Hall were kept absolutely confidential.""'
The authors give a very interesting historical and cultural ex-
to regulate legislative elections. . . .They held powerful controls over the as-
semblies, including the right to reject the speaker of the house. . . .Although
the king possessed some (but not all) of these controls over Parliament, no mon-
arch had dared to exercise much direct control since 1688.
D. FARBER & S. SHERRY, supra note 2, at 79.
10. D. FARBER & S. SHERRY, supra note 2, at 38.
11. The revolution had rejected England's rule. England herself had long since rejected
the divine right of kings to rule. Charles had been executed after parliamentary trial in 1649,
and the Glorious Revolution of 1688 created parliamentary authority which has never since
been challenged.
12. The text of our Constitution does not select a particular theory either. The preamble
states that the People "do ordain and establish this Constitution," but both ratification and
amendment are accomplished by the states as entities. U.S. CONST. art. VII. See also U.S.
CONST. art. V.
13. D. FARBER & S. SHERRY, supra note 2, at 27.
14. D. FARBER & S. SHERRY, supra note 2, at 27.
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planation for the success of the rule:
Maintaining absolute secrecy among fifty-five men with politi-
cal ambitions and widely divergent views was possible only be-
cause of the nature of the gathering. All of the delegates were
gentlemen, to whom politics was serious but private busi-
ness. . . . The delegates to the Federal Convention knew,
moreover, that any candid discussion of the ills of American pol-
ity would inevitably touch on sensitive issues, including, for ex-
ample, the dangers of too much democracy. Such discussions
were possible only in secrecy."'
Whether they were right or wrong, these gentlemen of the con-
vention set a fine standard for keeping confidences when agreed or
required. It is a standard that we all can benefit recalling when we
deal with professional, collegial, or civic matters requiring
confidence.
III. STABILITY AND CHANGE
Americans often express the notion that our Constitution is per-
manent and stable. Yet from the beginning the Constitution has been
a story of change. One can scarcely delve into a chapter of the book
without confronting some very impressive example of dynamism in
our history.
A fine example of change comes from the adoption of the post
Civil War amendments. The original Constitution fully recognized
and ratified slavery as an institution.16 It would take amendment to
eliminate this denial of human right.
During the debates on ratification of the Thirteenth Amend-
ment, members of Congress were concerned with the abolition of
slavery, and with the proper scope of power of the national govern-
ment. In the final debate, one Congressman urged that if the pro-
posed amendment were adopted, it would admit a scope of power far
too grand to be consistent with the fundamentals of our system. He
argued that if the proponents of the Thirteenth Amendment were
correct, then:
All then that you would have to do in order to make the Con-
gresss of the United States as omnipotent as the Parliament of
Great Britain would be to change the fifth article of the Consti-
tution, and provide that a majority of a quorum in Congress
might amend the Constitution, and that would confer upon the
15. D. FARBER & S. SHERRY, supra note 2, at 28.
16. See U.S. CONST. art. I § 2, § 9. See also U.S. CONST. art. IV § 2.
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Congress of the United States as plenary, omnipotent, unlimited
power over every subject of legislation, ay, sir, it would make
the Congress of the United States as omnipotent as the English
Parliament.7
The logic of Article V does appear to grant that broad a sweep
to the amendment power.'
The congressional debates on ratification of the Thirteenth
Amendment appealed to underlying values of the Constitution as
well as to the logic of the amendment power. Mr. Ashley, a propo-
nent, urged: "I do not believe any constitution can legalize the en-
slavement of men."' 9 To him it was simply beyond the power of any
government to be able to legitimize slavery. Slave laws were in es-
sence no law. Congressman Rogers, however, urged that it would be
wrong to concede power to define property to a central government,
for it might in turn "interfere with marital relations in the
States. . .[and] take away the constitutional provision that a man
shall enjoy property by descent ... ""
In the end, slavery was swept out of the Constitution and the
course of our history altered. Yet the urgency and concern evident in
the debates show that these political changes were not simple.
In concluding, I would like to return to the American attitude
concerning the stability of our Constitution. It is likean enormous
keel on a ship. Whatever happens, the Constitution does not really
change. The notion of constancy is present despite twenty-six
amendments, innumerable hotly debated decisions, and changes in
guiding precedents.
The notion of stability is misleading, yet it also reflects a sound
assessment of how our society works. We expect-I speak here of
average expectations, not those of the legally trained-that our Con-
stitution will reflect main values that may be established after a truly
monumental effort. Amendments may be necessary from time to
time, but normally these should be confined to larger matters. Even
when the sizzling hot issue of the day, abortion or flag burning,
comes along, people expect that the existing institutions of the con-
17. D. FARBER & S. SHERRY, supra note 2, at 282 (argument of Congressman C. A.
White).
18. D. FARBER & S. SHERRY, supra note 2, at 292. The Amendment article does con-
tain some limits. Its last clause preserves each state's "equal suffrage" in the Senate. The
substance of that restriction is inconsistent with the arguments of Senator Saulsbury that ratifi-
cation of the Thirteenth would mean that the Amendment power could be used to "blot out of
existence any State in this Union."
19. D. FARBER & S. SHERRY, supra note 2, at 278.
20. D. FARBER & S. SHERRY, supra note 2, at 280.
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stitutional government will be able to work and resolve it. We be-
lieve that at the end of the working and resolving our society will be
fairer, more just. If not, then let us amend.

